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Article 13 of China’s Anti-Monopoly Law (AML) adopted an 
enumeration methodology to prohibit horizontal agreements, but the 
items enumerated do not include bid rigging.  However, through case 
analysis, it is found that the National Development and Reform 
Commission of the P.R.C. penalized business operators that 
participated in bid rigging, an enumeration known as “fixing or 
changing the price of commodities,” according to article 13.1(1).  
Such practice is inappropriate as article 13.1(1) should be regarded 
as “specific price fixing,” as defined in this Note, which does not 
cover bid rigging.  This penalization neglected the uniqueness of bid 
rigging as well.  In contrast, article 13.1(6), a fallback provision, 
provides an appropriate legal basis for the AML to regulate bid 
rigging.  Nevertheless, the fallback provision has limited publicity 
and could not exhibit the guiding function of the AML.  Since bid 
rigging is one of the most serious types of anti-competition agreement, 
article 13 should be perfected to regulate bid rigging. 
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I. ISSUES AND QUESTIONS RAISED 
Article 13 of the China Anti-Monopoly Law (AML) prohibits 
competing business operators from making any monopoly 
agreements. 2   Article 13.1 enumerates five types of prohibited 
horizontal agreements. 3   However, a major type of horizontal 
agreements is missing from the enumerations—bid rigging.  
Following the five types of prohibited horizontal agreements is an 
enumeration that serves as a fallback provision.  According to the 
fallback provision, non-enumerated agreements as determined by the 
AML enforcement agencies are also prohibited.4  However, none of 
the AML enforcement agencies has so far exercised the fallback 
provision, or other means, to define bid rigging as a type of prohibited 
monopoly agreement.  Therefore, bid rigging is not explicitly covered 
by article 13 of the AML. 
However, through theoretical analysis, many Chinese 
academics agree that bid rigging is a horizontal monopoly agreement 
that should be prohibited by the AML, China’s Anti-Unfair 
Competition Law article 27, Criminal Law article 223, and Bidding 
Law.5  In this context, Chinese academics have conducted theoretical 
                                                                                                               
 2 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Fanlongduanfa ( ) [Anti-
Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. 
Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 30, 2007, effective Aug. 1, 2008), translated in Lawinfochina, 
http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=0&CGid=96789 
[http://perma.cc/A4S9-J78S] [hereinafter AML]. 
 3 Enumerations under AML article 13.1:  
 
(1) Fixing or changing the price of commodities;  
(2) Restricting the production quantity or sales volume of commodities;  
(3) Dividing the sales market or the raw material supply market;  
(4) Restricting the purchase of new technology or new facilities or the 
development of new technology or new products;  
(5) Jointly boycotting transactions; or  
(6) Other monopoly agreements as determined by the Anti-Monopoly 
Law Enforcement Agency under the State Council.  
 
Id. art. 13. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Fanbuzhengdangjingzhengfa (
) [Anti-Unfair Competition Law of the People’s Republic of China] 
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Sept. 2, 1993, effective Dec. 1, 
1993), http://www.lawinfochina.com/Display.aspx?lib=law&Cgid=6359 [http://perma.cc/
3NCJ-28A7]; Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingfa (1997 Xiuding) (
(1997 )) [Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China (1997 Revision)] 
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 1, 1997, effective Dec. 25, 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol12/iss2/4
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research related to the coordination of the AML and other laws in 
regulating bid rigging or perfecting the AML in bid rigging 
regulations. 6   These studies adopted a theoretical, rather than 
practical, approach as the AML bid-rigging case decisions were not 
published until the cases involving Japanese automobiles and 
International RORO shipping were published in recent years.  These 
cases provided a new foundation for the study of bid rigging 
regulation by the AML.  Although bid rigging is not explicitly 
covered by article 13 of the AML, case analysis reveals that law 
enforcement agencies “borrowed” one of the article’s enumerations, 
the provisions on fixing or changing the price of commodities (i.e., 
article 13.1(1)), to penalize bid riggers.  Based on these decisions, this 
Note addresses 1) the appropriateness of penalizing bid riggers using 
article 13.1(1); 2) the appropriateness of the article 13.1(6) fallback 
provision as an alternative; and 3) whether bid rigging should be 
added to article 13 as one of its enumerations.  
II. BID RIGGING: DEFINITION, FORMS, AND HARM 
From time to time, both public institutions and private 
enterprises need to purchase goods and services from the market for 
their operations.  The market is often filled with many suppliers of 
                                                                                                               
1999), http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?id=354&lib=law&SearchKeyword=
criminal%20law&SearchCKeyword= [http://perma.cc/JK29-XSQQ]; Zhonghua Renmin 
Gongheguo Toubiao Zhaobiaofa ( ) [Bidding Law of the 
People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., 
Aug. 30, 1999, effective Jan. 1, 2000), http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?
id=1014&lib=law&SearchKeyword=The%20Bidding%20Law&SearchCKeyword= [http://
perma.cc/CR34-7F9C]. 
 6 See Song Huihang ( ), Chuantong Zhaotoubiao de Fanlongduanfa Guizhi (
) [Regulation of Bid Rigging by the Anti-Monopoly Law] (May 
2014) (Master’s degree thesis, Kunming University of Science and Technology) (on file with 
author) (discussing theoretical research related to bid rigging); Jiang Senmiao & Song 
Huihang (  & ), Lun Chuantong Zhaotoubiao Fanlongduanfa Guizhi de 
Wanshan ( ) [To Improve the Regulation of Bid Rigging 
by the Anti-Monopoly Law], 2 JINGJI SHIYE ( ) [ECON. VISION] 463, 463–464 (2013) 
(discussing research related to AML); Wu Jinwei ( ), Chuantong Zhaotoubiao Falv 
Wenti Yanjiu ( ) [Research on the Legal Issues of Bid-Rigging] 
(Apr. 2006) (Ph.D. thesis, Central South University) (on file with author) (discussing 
research related to bid rigging); Luo Linlin ( ), Zhengfu Caigouzhong Chuantong 
Toubiao Falv Guizhi Yanjiu ( ) [Study on the Legal 
Regulation Relating to Bid-Rigging in Government Procurement]  (May 2013) (Master’s 
degree thesis, Zhengzhou University) (on file with author) (discussing research related to bid 
rigging). 
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these goods and services.  The price of goods and services varies 
among suppliers.  Instead of reaching out to each supplier separately 
to ask for product information and quotes, the buyer may invite 
suppliers to bid on a procurement contract.  The bidding process is 
hidden and competitive in nature.  All interested suppliers could 
submit their quotes to the buyer within a certain period of time.  After 
receiving all of the quotes, the buyer will assign the contract to the 
winner.  During the bidding process, each bidder works 
independently and is not supposed to know who else is participating, 
not to mention the quotes of its competitors.  Bidders tend to lower 
their quote as much as possible to increase the chance of being 
selected by the buyer.  This process brings economic efficiency to the 
buyer, as the buyer can obtain supplies at the lowest cost.  
Bidders understand the rules of the game well.  They know 
that even if they win the contract, part of the profit is dissipated during 
the competition process and goes to the buyer’s pocket.  Therefore, 
bidders have a motive for colluding and engaging in horizontal bid 
rigging, or simply bid rigging, to avoid the dissipation of profit.7  
According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), bid rigging occurs when “businesses, that 
would otherwise be expected to compete, secretly conspire to raise 
prices or lower the quality of goods or services for purchasers who 
wish to acquire products or services through a bidding process.”8  Bid 
rigging exists in four major forms: cover bidding, bid suppression, 
bid rotation, and market allocation.9 
Cover Bidding: Colluding bidders first select a winning 
bidder among themselves.  The rest submit quotes slightly higher, or 
even unreasonably higher, than that of the predetermined winning 
bidder.  Alternatively, those predetermined losing bidders will 
deliberately include unacceptable terms in their bid to avoid being 
chosen by the buyer.  By doing so, bidders can create the appearance 
                                                                                                               
 7 Specifically, bid rigging can be classified into horizontal bid rigging and vertical bid 
rigging.  The former is bid rigging formed between bidders, while the latter is formed 
between the buyer and bidders.  As this Note only concerns horizontal bid rigging, the term 
“bid rigging” is used interchangeably with “horizontal bid rigging.” 
 8 ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT [OECD], 
GUIDELINES FOR FIGHTING BID RIGGING IN PUBLIC PROCUREMENT 1–2 (2009), 
http://www.oecd.org/competition/cartels/42851044.pdf [http://perma.cc/J8UN-XY4N]. 
 9 Id.  
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol12/iss2/4
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of competition and “cover” their intent to lead the buyer to choose 
their predetermined winning bidder.10 
Bid Suppression: Colluding bidders first select a winning 
bidder among themselves.  Then, one or more of the predetermined 
losing bidders will inhibit themselves from participating in the bid, or 
withdraw their previously submitted bids.  By doing so, the 
predetermined losing bidders will have no chance to be selected by 
the buyer.11 
Bid Rotation: Colluding bidders agree to take turns being the 
predetermined winner over a series of bids.  The ways in which bid-
rotation agreements are implemented can vary.12 
Market Allocation: Colluding bidders determine who the 
winning bidder will be based on geographic areas or buyers.13  For 
example, imagine two colluding bidders, X and Y, in a market.  They 
made a market allocation agreement in which X is the predetermined 
winner in the south while Y is the winner in the north.  Whenever 
there is a buyer from the south inviting bidders to bid, Y will help X 
win by submitting a cover-bid or suppressing himself from bidding. 
When forming one of the above bid rigging agreements, 
colluding bid riggers often make a subcontract arrangement.14  Under 
the arrangement, once the predetermined winning bidder successfully 
obtains the contract from the buyer, the winner will subcontract the 
project to helpful (i.e., colluding) losing bidders.  This explains why 
some firms are willing to play the role of predetermined losing 
bidders in the first place—all the colluding bidders could share the 
profit from the procurement contract under a subcontract agreement. 
Bid-rigging is considered one of the most severe type of anti-
competitive agreements.  In 1998, the OECD first introduced the term 
“hardcore cartel.”  In simple terms, it refers to agreements formed 
between competitors involving any one of the following behaviors: 
                                                                                                               
 10 Id. 
 11 Id. 
 12 Id. 
 13 Id. 
 14 Preventing and Detecting Bid Rigging, Price Fixing, and Market Allocation in Post-
disaster Rebuilding projects: An Antitrust Primer for Agents and Procurement Officials, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Jun. 25, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/atr/preventing-and-detecting-bid-
rigging-price-fixing-and-market-allocation-post-disaster-rebuilding [http://perma.cc/C6EZ-
HX3S]. 
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price fixing, market allocation, output restriction, and bid rigging.15  
According to the OECD, a hardcore cartel represents the “most 
egregious violations of competition law.”16  As bid rigging is one of 
the most serious anti-competitive behaviors, many countries impose 
stringent regulations.  In the United States, section 1 of the Sherman 
Antitrust Act prohibits agreements in restraint of trade.  Section 1 is 
a general provision with enumerated examples of prohibited 
agreements.  Bid rigging falls under section 1 and is considered as a 
per se violation of the Sherman Act.17  In the European Union, article 
101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) 
has a general rule that prohibits anti-competitive agreements.  Some 
examples of prohibited agreements are provided in the article.  Any 
agreements that violate the general rule, even those not listed as an 
example, are covered by the article.  From case decisions, it is clear 
that bid rigging violates the general rule and is regulated by the article 
in the European Union.18  In the United Kingdom, bid rigging is 
considered as a Cartel Offence under the Enterprise Act 2002, of 
which section 188(5) defines “Bid rigging arrangements.” 19   In 
Canada, bid rigging is considered as a specific offence in relation to 
competition under the Competition Act section 47(2).  In Hong Kong, 
bid rigging is interpreted as “serious anti-competitive conduct” under 
Competition Ordinance section 2.  In addition to the above, bid 
rigging implicates criminal penalties in United States, United 
Kingdom, and Canada.20  Overall, bid rigging is considered serious 
anti-competitive behavior internationally.  Many countries’ 
competition laws have either adopted a general provision that covers 
and regulates bid rigging, enumerated bid rigging as an example of 
prohibited agreements, or dedicated a separate section to regulate bid 
                                                                                                               
 15 OECD, RECOMMENDATION OF THE COUNCIL CONCERNING EFFECTIVE ACTION 
AGAINST HARD CORE CARTELS [C(98)35/FINAL] 3 (1998). 
 16 Id. at 2. 
 17 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 14. 
 18 Press Release, European Comm’n, Antitrust: Commission Fines Suppliers of Optical 
Disc Drives €116 Million for Cartel, (Oct. 21, 2015), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-15-5885_en.pdf [http://perma.cc/T6AA-EW26]. 
 19 Enterprise Act, 2002, c. 40, § 188(5) (U.K.), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/
ukpga/2002/40/part/6 [http://perma.cc/6A3W-M4Z5]. 
 20 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 14; Enterprise Act, 2002, c. 40 (U.K.), 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2002/40/part/6 [http://perma.cc/6A3W-M4Z5]; 
Competition Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-34, art. 47(2) (Can.), http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/
PDF/C-34.pdf [https://perma.cc/W9R7-KNRG]. 
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rigging.  Moreover, some nations have taken stringent measures to 
combat it. 
III. THE REMOVAL OF BID RIGGING FROM THE DRAFT 
AML 
Chinese lawmakers have been aware of the seriousness of bid 
rigging.  On June 24, 2006, during the 22nd Session of the Tenth 
National People’s Congress Standing Committee, the State Council 
of the People’s Republic of China submitted the Draft Anti-
Monopoly Law (Draft) to the NPC Standing Committee for its first 
deliberation.21  At that time, under the Draft, bid rigging was not only 
included, but also entitled to stricter regulations than other horizontal 
monopoly agreements.22 
Firstly, article 7 of the Draft, like article 13 of the AML that 
was eventually implemented in 2008, enumerated horizontal 
agreements that were prohibited.23  Although the wording adopted in 
the two articles are slightly different, the content of the five prohibited 
agreements enumerated is the same.  Also, both articles include a 
fallback provision.  The major difference between Draft article 7 and 
AML article 13 is that the latter includes a simple definition of 
monopoly agreement.  In the Draft, a similar definition could be 
found separately in article 3.2. 
Secondly, the Draft contains article 9, separate from article 7, 
to prohibit bid rigging.24  Draft article 9 prohibits business operators 
from bid rigging, as well as eliminating or restraining competition 
                                                                                                               
 21 Under the Law on Legislation of the P.R.C., a bill that has been put on the agenda of 
the Standing Committee session shall in general be deliberated three times in the current 
session of the Standing Committee before being voted on.  See Zhonghua Renmin 
Gongheguo Lifafa ( ) [Law on Legislation] (promulgated by the 
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 15, 2000, effective July 1, 2000), art. 27 
http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?id=386&lib=law&SearchKeyword=law%20on
%20legislation&SearchCKeyword= [https://perma.cc/347G-FF26] (reflecting the first 
deliberation). 
 22 Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China (draft) (June 2006 version 
for the submission to the 22th Session of the Tenth National Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s 
Cong.) translated in FANLONGDUAN LIFA REDIAN WENTI ( ) [HOT 
SPOTS OF CHINESE ANTIMONOPOLY LEGISLATION]  App’x 2 (Wang Xiaoye ( ) ed., 
2007). [hereinafter Draft (P.R.C.)]. 
 23 Draft (P.R.C.), supra note 22, art. 7. 
 24 Draft (P.R.C.), supra note 22, art. 9. 
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during the bidding process.  In other words, it prohibits horizontal bid 
rigging, rather than vertical bid rigging. 
Thirdly, article 10 of the Draft states that “efficient” 
agreements could be exempted from the prohibition. 25   Any 
agreements that satisfy the exemption criteria listed in Draft article 
10 are not subject to Draft article 7, meaning that they are not 
considered horizontal monopoly agreements.  Article 15 of the AML 
corresponds to article 10 of the Draft.26  Any agreements that satisfy 
the exemption criteria listed in the AML article 15 are not subject to 
AML article 13, meaning that they are not considered horizontal 
monopoly agreements.  Although the wordings adopted in the two 
articles are slightly different, the contents of the exemption criteria 
are more or less the same as those under Draft article 7.  In the Draft, 
the article 10 exemption is applicable to agreements enumerated in 
article 7, but not bid rigging regulated by article 9.  Therefore, some 
academics viewed such structuring as a way for legislators to reveal 
that bid rigging is illegal per se.27 
During the legislation process, Professor Shi Jianzhong 
criticized that dedicating a separate and independent article to 
regulate bid rigging is a waste of legislative resources.  Instead, given 
the fact that bid rigging is a kind of horizontal monopoly agreement, 
bid rigging could have been integrated into article 7 of the Draft as 
another enumerated example of prohibited agreements. 28   Some 
counties set up a separate provision to regulate bid rigging because 
bid rigging is a typical area where a mixed monopoly agreement is 
likely to be formed.  That is, it is possible that horizontal and vertical 
bid rigging are mixed into one agreement and appear at the same 
time.29  Therefore, some countries consider it necessary to distinguish 
bid rigging from horizontal agreement or vertical agreement 
provisions. 
                                                                                                               
 25 Draft (P.R.C.), supra note 22, art. 10. 
 26 Draft (P.R.C.), supra note 22, art. 15. 
 27 FANLONGDUAN LIFA REDIAN WENTI ( ) [HOT SPOTS OF CHINESE 
ANTIMONOPOLY LEGISLATION]  App’x 2 (Wang Xiaoye ( ) ed., 2007). 
 28 Shi Jianzhong ( ), Shiping Woguo Fanlongduanfa Cao’an Youguan 
Longduanxieyi de Guiding ( ) [Comments on 
the Monopoly Agreement Regulations in the Draft Antimonopoly Law], 16 ZHONGGUO 
GONGSHANG GUANLI YANJIU ( ) [STUDY ON CHINA ADMIN. FOR INDUS. 
AND COMMERCE] 32, 33 (2007). 
 29 Id. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol12/iss2/4
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After the first deliberation of the Draft, the NPC Legal 
Committee submitted the Second Reading Draft, Third Reading Draft, 
and Proposed Draft for Vote to the NPC Standing Committee for its 
deliberation on June 24, August 24, and August 29, 2007, 
respectively.  On August 30, 2007, the NPC Standing Committee 
passed the current AML.  Throughout the year, in each of the three 
submissions of the amended draft to the Standing Committee, the 
Legal Committee made a report and illustrated the major 
amendments.30  However, the Legal Committee did not mention and 
explain the amendments made to the Draft article 9 in the three 
reports.  Moreover, the government did not publish the text of the 
Second Reading Draft, Third Reading Draft, or the Proposed Draft 
for Vote.  Therefore, it is not known when and what amendments 
were made to the Draft article 9, not to mention the reasons for the 
amendments.  All we know is that article 9 was removed after the first 
deliberation in the legislative process, as there was no separate 
provision to prohibit bid rigging in the AML since.  Additionally, bid 
rigging was not added to the enumerations of horizontal monopoly 
agreements in the AML article 13.  It is unlikely that the legislators 
“forgot” to add bid rigging to article 13 of the AML after removing 
article 9 from the Draft.  One reason that this author could think of to 
explain the absence of bid rigging in the AML article 13 is that law 
makers believed that bid rigging was already regulated under article 
27 of the Criminal Law as well as the Bidding Law. 
                                                                                                               
 30 HU KANGSHENG ( ), NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. LAW COMM., GUANYU ZHONGHUA 
RENMIN GONGHEGUO FANLONGDUANFA (CAO’AN) XIUGAI QINGKUANG DE HUIBAO (
) [Report on the Amendment of 
the Antitrust Law of the People’s Republic of China (Draft)] (2007), 
http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/zt/2007-06/24/content_1382614.htm [https://perma.cc/MRV5-
PEEC]; JIANG QIANGUI ( ), NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. LAW COMM., GUANYU ZHONGHUA 
RENMIN GONGHEGUO FANLONGDUANFA (CAO’AN ERCI SHENYIGAO) SHENYI JIEGUO DE 
BAOGAO ( ) 
[Report on the Result of Deliberation of the Antitrust Law of the People’s Republic of China 
(Second Reading Draft)] (2007), http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/gongbao/2007-
10/09/content_5374669.htm [https://perma.cc/E4P9-G5PJ]; YANG JINGYU ( ), NAT’L 
PEOPLE’S CONG. LAW COMM., GUANYU ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO FANLONGDUANFA 
(CAO’AN SANCI SHENYIGAO) XIUGAI YIJIAN DE BAOGAO (
) [Report on Opinions on Amending the Antitrust 
Law of the People’s Republic of China (Third Reading Draft)] (2007), 
http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/gongbao/2007-10/09/content_5374668.htm [https://perma.cc/
BQ29-YXQR]. 
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IV. BID RIGGING CASES FINED FOR VIOLATING AML 
ARTICLE 13.1(1) 
Article 13 of the AML does not enumerate bid rigging as a 
prohibited monopoly agreement.  At the same time, as mentioned 
above, there are other laws to regulate such anti-competitive conduct.  
In reality, some bid riggers are penalized based on the violation of 
one of the article 13 enumerations: Fixing or changing the price of 
commodities (i.e. article 13.1(1)).  Below are two recent cases to 
illustrate its application. 
A. Japanese Automobiles Part Cases 
On August 15, 2014, the National Development and Reform 
Commission of the P.R.C. (NDRC) imposed decisions for 
administrative penalties or exemption of administrative penalties to 
twelve Japanese automobile parts enterprises.31  On August 20, the 
NDRC published a press release on its webpage and disclosed the 
cases and decisions.32  On September 18, the NDRC published twelve 
written decisions online.33  By analyzing the written decisions, it can 
be found that eight out of the twelve cases were “bid rigging” cases.34  
                                                                                                               
 31 The parties in the twelve cases were: Hitachi Automotive Systems Ltd., Denso 
Corporation, Aisin Industry Co.,Ltd., Mitsubishi Electric Corporation, Mitsuba Corporation, 
Yazaki Corporation, Furukawa Electric Co.,Ltd., Sumitomo Electric Industries, Ltd., Nachi-
Fujikoshi Corporation., NSK Ltd., NTN Corporation, and JTEKT Corporation. 
 32 Press Release, NDRC Policy Research Office ( ), Riben Shierjia 
Qiye Shishi Qiche Lingbujian He Zhoucheng Jiage Longduan Bei Guojia Fazhangaigewei 
Fakuan 12.35 Yiyuan (
12.35 ) [Twelve Japanese Companies Implemented Price Agreement on 
Automobile Warts and Were Fined 1.2 Billion Yuan by the NDRC],  
http://zys.ndrc.gov.cn/xwfb/201408/t20140820_622755.html [http://perma.cc/9PN6-HBVZ] 
(last visited Mar. 1, 2017). 
 33 NDRC, Mianchu Xingzheng Chufa Juedingshu Fagaiban Jiajian Chufa Dierhao (
[2014] 2 ) [Decision on Exemption of 
Administrative Penalty [2014] No. 2],  http://www.sdpc.gov.cn/fzgggz/jgjdyfld/fjgld/
201409/t20140918_626086.html [http://perma.cc/H9NP-8QDH]; NDRC, Mianchu 
Xingzheng Chufa Juedingshu Fagaiban Jiajian Chufa (
[2014]3-13 ) [Decision for Administrative Penalty [2014] No. 3-13],  http://www.sdpc.gov.
cn/gzdt/201409/t20140918_626088.html [http://perma.cc/5LSA-5G9B]. 
 34 NDRC, Mianchu Xingzheng Chufa Juedingshu Fagaiban Jiajian Chufa Dierhao (
 [2014] 2 ) [Decision on Exemption of 
Administrative Penalty [2014] No. 2]; NDRC, Mianchu Xingzheng Chufa Juedingshu 
Fagaiban Jiajian Chufa (  [2014] 3-9 ) [Decision for 
Administrative Penalty [2014] No. 3-9], http://www.sdpc.gov.cn/gzdt/201409/
t20140918_626088.html [http://perma.cc/LDE2-Q437]. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol12/iss2/4
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The eight parties in the cases were: Hitachi Automotive Systems Ltd., 
Denso Corporation, Aisin Industry Co., Ltd., Mitsubishi Electric 
Corporation, Mitsuba Corporation, Yazaki Corporation, Furukawa 
Electric Co., Ltd., and Sumitomo Electric Industries, Ltd.  According 
to the written decisions, between the second half of 2000 and early 
2010, the eight competing companies repeatedly reached and 
implemented agreements on the submission of quotes for various 
automobiles part purchase orders offered by different car 
manufactures.   
A reporter interviewed an NDRC Anti-Monopoly Bureau 
official for the eight cases. 35   The official pointed out that car 
manufacturers sent Letters of Inquiry to a number of suppliers in 
order to select automobiles part suppliers for a new car model 
development.  During the selection process, car manufacturers 
considered multiple factors, such as the prices, technical 
specifications, and production capacities of the suppliers.  As there 
was minimal difference between the eight companies in terms of the 
non-price factors, the quotes they submitted became the decisive 
factor for the car manufacturers to select their suppliers.  After 
receiving the Letters of Inquiry, the eight companies allocated the 
purchase orders among themselves internally and secretly.  The 
predetermined winning company submitted the lowest quote to the 
car manufacturers, while the remaining companies submitted higher 
quotes.  Such practice is exactly the cover bidding approach 
explained in Part II of this Note.  In addition, an industry insider 
pointed out that the practice that Japanese automobiles part 
companies took turns to win the bid by cover bidding, and this 
seemed to have become an “industry norm.”36 
Although the NDRC did not mention the word “bid rigging,” 
or any related terms, in either the press release or the eight written 
decisions, there is no doubt that the eight cases were bid rigging as 
shown by both the written decisions and the above-mentioned 
interview.  However, since the AML does not expressly prohibit bid 
                                                                                                               
 35 Zhou Rui ( ), Riqi Longduan Liangzongzui: Chuantong Toubiao Xieshang 
Zhangjia (  “ ”:  ) [Two Crimes of Japanese Enterprises: 
Bid Rigging (and) Price Raising], ZHONGGUO XINWENWANG [CHINANEWS] (Aug. 20, 2014), 
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 36 Wang Xing ( ), Rixi Cheqi Hengxianglongduan Xianyi (
) [Japanese Automobile Related Companies Suspected of Horizontal Monopoly], 
ZHONGGUO JINGYINGBAO [CHINESE BUS. JOURNAL] (Aug. 18, 2014), http://news.cb.com.cn/
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rigging from competition operators, as stated in the written decisions, 
the NDRC eventually classified the agreements involved in these 
cases as ones fixing or changing the prices of automobile parts, which 
violated the first enumeration of AML article 13.1, “fixing or 
changing the price of commodities.”  As the eight companies had 
violated article 13, they were fined by the NDRC according to article 
46.1 of the AML.  In total, the NDRC imposed a fine of 831 million 
Chinese yuan to the eight companies.37 
B. International RORO Shipping Cases 
RORO cargo refers to wheeled cargo, such as automobiles, 
construction machinery, and trucks.  RORO (cargo) shipping is 
different from ordinary shipping.  Ordinarily, only the parts of 
automobiles could be loaded onto vessels.  The parts would be 
assembled upon arrival.  In contrast, RORO shipping allows the 
wheeled cargo to roll on and off vessels.  Therefore, the RORO ship 
used in the business is also known as the “roll-on/roll-off” ship.38  
The cost of an RORO ship is very high, as it must be built in a huge 
size to carry more vehicles.  At the same time, the use of RORO ships 
is unilateral.  Hence, although the cost barrier to enter into the 
business is high, the homogeneous nature of the service promotes 
price competition in the RORO shipping industry.  According to a 
business insider in China, when there is excessive competition, the 
competing practitioners will increase their profits by forming price 
alliances and allocating the market.39 
On December 28, 2015, the NDRC imposed decisions of 
administrative penalty and exemption of administrative penalty 
towards eight international RORO shipping companies.  On 
December 28, the NDRC made a press release on its webpage and 
                                                                                                               
 37 NDRC, supra note 34. 
 38 Liu Nan ( ), Bajia Guoji Haiyun Qiye Shishi Jiagelongduan Beifakuan 4 Yiyuan 
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disclosed the cases and decisions.40  On December 31, the NDRC 
published the eight written decisions online.41  The parties in the eight 
cases were NYK Line, Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha, Ltd., Mitsui O.S.K. 
Lines, Ltd., EUKOR Car Carriers Inc., Wallenius Wilhelmsen 
Logistics, Compania Sud Americana De Vapores S.A., Eastern Car 
Liner,Ltd., and Compania Chilena De Navegacion Interoceanica S.A. 
According to the written decisions, between 2008 and 
September 2012, the eight companies repeatedly reached and 
implemented agreements on the submission of quotes for RORO 
shipping service (between China and other countries) requested by 
different RORO cargo suppliers (i.e., the buyer of RORO shipping 
services).  In order to reduce price competition, the parties first made 
agreements to set the minimum value of quotes that they could submit 
to buyers.  Then, the parties determined who the winning bidder 
would be based upon assigned shipping routes or buyers.  By doing 
so, the eight companies manipulated RORO shipping prices and 
reduced competition.  From the above, it is clear that bid rigging 
existed via the presence of cover bidding and market allocation, 
among other forms.  Although both the Japanese automobile part 
cases and RORO shipping cases are bid rigging cases, there is a 
significant difference between the press releases.  In the automobile 
cases, the NDRC did not mention any terms related to bid rigging. In 
contrast, the NDRC highlighted that the RORO shipping cases were 
instances of bid rigging in the title of the press release.42 
However, similar to the automobile cases, the NDRC did not 
include the term “bid rigging” in the body of the written decisions of 
                                                                                                               
 40 Press Release, NDRC Policy Research Office ( ), Bajia 
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Mianchu Xingzheng Chufa Juedingshu [2015] 2-8 hao ( [2015] 2-8 ) 
[Decision on Exemption of Administrative Penalty [2015] No. 2-8], http://www.ndrc.gov.
cn/zwfwzx/xzcf [https://perma.cc/8GBL-RHFD].  
 42 Press Release, NDRC Policy Research Office ( ), Bajia 
Gunzhuang Huowu Guojihaiyun Qiye Chuantong Toubiao Hangwei Beichufa 4.07 Yiyuan 
( 4.07 ) [Eight International RORO 
Shipping Companies were Fined 407 Million Yuan for Bid Rigging], http://zys.ndrc.gov.cn/
xwfb/201512/t20151228_768888.html [http://perma.cc/YQZ2-3MAH] (last visited Sept. 1, 
2016). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2017
2016] CHINA’S ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW 257 
the RORO shipping cases.  One explanation might be that bid rigging 
was not enumerated in AML article 13.  Eventually, the NDRC 
summarized the RORO shipping companies’ conduct as “forming 
and implementing price quotation agreement” and “allocation of 
shipping routes and customers.”  The NDRC decided that the parties 
had violated the first enumeration, “fixing or changing the price of 
commodities,” and the third enumeration, “dividing the sales market 
or the raw material supply market,” under article 13.1 of the AML.   
One possible explanation for the decision is that regardless of 
the facts, the NDRC views bid rigging as a combination of price 
fixing and market allocation.  There was a contract dispute case in 
China in 2009 and 2010.  In the judgment, the court held that “bid 
rigging, in fact, is the existence of market allocation and price fixing 
in a combined form.”43  However, as anti-monopoly enforcement 
agencies are not bound by that court decision, they do not need to 
adopt this definition of bid rigging.  For example, in the Japanese 
automobile cases, the NDRC did not consider there was a violation 
of the “dividing the sales market or the raw material supply market” 
enumeration; the NDRC instead applied article 13.1.  For example, 
as analyzed, this case involved at least two forms of bid rigging, 
namely cover bidding and market allocation.  However, it is not 
certain whether the NDRC used article 13.1(1) and article 13.1(3) to 
represent cover bidding and market allocation separately, or whether 
it used them both to represent market allocation.44  In any event, as a 
result of violating the AML article 13, the eight RORO shipping 
companies were fined 407.44 million Chinese yuan in total.45 
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V. REFLECTIONS ON INCORPORATING BID RIGGING 
INTO AML ARTICLE 13.1(1) 
Bid rigging is faintly discernible in article 13 of the AML.  
While bid rigging is not enumerated under the article, the case 
analyses from Part IV finds that the Anti-monopoly Authority has 
penalized business operators that participated in bid rigging under 
article 13.1(1), an enumeration known as “fixing or changing the 
price of commodities.”  This begs the question of whether bid rigging 
should be added to article 13 as an enumeration of a prohibited form 
of horizontal agreement.  To answer this question, we need to first 
determine whether it is appropriate to use article 13.1(1) to penalize 
bid riggers, and whether the fallback provision under article 13 is a 
better alternative to regulate bid rigging. 
Both China’s Criminal Law and Bidding Law have provisions 
prohibiting bid rigging.  Regulating bid rigging under the competition 
law system may raise problems, such as jurisdictional overlap and 
conflict of laws.  However, as presented in Part II of this Note, bid 
rigging is essentially a competition issue, and this view is 
internationally recognized.  In addition, case analysis reveals that bid 
rigging is considered as a violation of the AML in China.  Therefore, 
the discussions of whether bid rigging should be regulated by the 
competition law system or incorporated into the AML are lagging 
behind reality.  The fact that China has AUCL article 27 under its 
competition law system to regulate bid rigging does not eliminate the 
need to enumerate bid rigging under the AML article 13.  As 
illustrated by the above two cases, the NDRC selected to penalize bid 
riggers based on AML article 13, rather than AUCL article 27.  In 
short, the two cases demonstrated that, in practice, bid rigging is 
regulated under China’s competition law system and primarily by 
AML article 13. 
More specifically, the law enforcement agency penalized bid 
riggers according to the “fixing or changing the price of commodities” 
enumeration under article 13.1.  As bid rigging could fix or change 
commodity prices, the question is whether the current practice is an 
appropriate approach to regulate bid rigging. 
The definition of price fixing can be general or specific.  For 
the purposes of illustration, this Note will use the terms “general price 
fixing” and “specific price fixing,” respectively.  In its specific sense, 
price fixing refers only to agreements made between competing 
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business operators to charge consumers a specific price for a good or 
service.  For example, in 2014, there were cases in China where car 
dealers made and implemented agreements to fix the prices of vehicle 
sales and maintenance services.  These car dealers were penalized 
according to the “fixing or changing the price of commodities” 
enumeration.46   
In contrast, there is also a general definition of price fixing.  
In a fact sheet about the Commerce Act of New Zealand, the 
Commerce Commission explained that  
Price fixing includes agreements between competitors 
to charge customers a specific price for a good or 
service.  But it can also include agreements that 
ultimately affect the price a customer pays for a good 
or service.  For example, agreeing to rig bids, dividing 
markets by customer or area, or restricting output.47 
In the United States, bid rigging was held as “a price fixing-
agreement of the simplest kind.”48  The descriptions above support 
the existence of a general definition of “price fixing agreement” that 
includes bid rigging.  In the two China cases, bid rigging conduct was 
defined as a violation of AML article 13.1(1).  In other words, in daily 
practice, the law enforcement agency interprets the “fixing or 
changing the price of commodities” enumeration in a broad sense to 
encompass bid rigging.  In spite of this practice, article 13.1(1) should 
not continue to be used to regulate bid rigging for two reasons.  
First, merely applying the price fixing enumeration to regulate 
bid rigging ignores the uniqueness of bid rigging.  Bid rigging 
                                                                                                               
 46 See Chen Weiwei & Zhaochao (  & ), Kelaisile Shishi Jiagelongduan 
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conduct is nuanced.  For example, as introduced in Part II of this Note, 
bid rigging can exist in different forms, such as cover bidding, bid 
suppression, bid rotation, and market allocation.49  In the Japanese 
automobile parts cases, the NDRC did not mention the term “bid 
rigging” in either the written decisions or the press release.   
For purposes of comparison, a similar case exists in the 
United States.  In 2015, NGK Insulators Ltd. (hereinafter NGK), an 
automobile parts supplier, was fined 65.3 million USD.  NGK 
pleaded guilty to conspiring with others to fix prices and rig bids for 
ceramic substrates for automotive catalytic converters supplied to 
automobile manufacturers from at least July 2000 until February 
2010.  NGK’s conduct violated section 1 of the Sherman Act.  Section 
1 is a general provision with no enumerated examples of prohibited 
agreements.  Yet, the U.S. Department of Justice press release clearly 
states that NGK Insulators was “charged with price fixing and bid 
rigging in violation of the Sherman Act” and fined “for its role in a 
conspiracy to fix prices and rig bids.”50  The press release described 
NGK’s conduct as “agreeing to rig bids for, and to fix, stabilize, and 
maintain the prices.”51   
Thus, U.S. judicial bodies did not describe bid rigging as a 
conspiracy case or avoid mentioning the term “bid rigging.”  They 
highlighted the conduct of the defendants as “price fixing and bid 
rigging.”  This suggests that the United States has acknowledged the 
uniqueness of bid rigging and distinguished bid rigging from a price 
fixing agreement. 
Second, interpreting article 13.1(1) as general price fixing 
is wrong, in principle.  By analyzing the structure of article 13, it is 
clear that the “fixing or changing the price of commodities” 
enumeration means price fixing in a specific sense.  As explained 
above, general price fixing includes market allocation and output 
restriction.  The two monopoly agreements discussed above 
correspond to the second and third enumerations under article 13 (i.e., 
article 13.1(2) & 13.1(3)).  If the price fixing enumeration was 
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interpreted in a general sense, then market allocation and output 
restriction would not have been enumerated in the first place.  
Accordingly, the two cases of anti-competitive conduct would instead 
have been covered by article 13.1(1).  In other words, interpreting 
article 13.1(1) as a general price fixing provision would make 
purposeless the specific agreements enumerated in the article.  
Therefore, article 13.1(1) should be interpreted as an instance of 
specific price fixing that does not include bid rigging.  If one keeps 
this conclusion in mind when analyzing the two bid rigging cases in 
China, one is led to realize that the NDRC expanded its jurisdiction 
by interpreting article 13.1(1) as a general price fixing provision.   
Through such expansion, the NDRC could apply article 13.1(1) to 
regulate horizontal agreements that are not enumerated, such as bid 
rigging, as long as they ultimately have a price fixing effect.  Given 
the broad definition of general price fixing, the law enforcement 
agency can now regulate most, if not all, kinds of horizontal 
agreements using article 13.1(1). 
Given the fact that there is a fallback provision under article 
13, it is unnecessary for the NDRC to expand the interpretation of 
price fixing to include bid rigging as a prohibited agreement.  
According to AML article 13.1(6), in addition to the five specific 
agreements enumerated, other horizontal agreements as determined 
by the Anti-monopoly Law Enforcement Agency under the State 
Council are also prohibited.  The fallback provision was established 
to deal with the complexities that the AML would encounter in 
practice. 52   The NDRC, one of the three anti-monopoly law 
enforcement agencies in China, is responsible for price-related anti-
monopoly practices.  Thus, the NDRC has the authority to determine 
if non-enumerated conduct constitutes an example of a prohibited 
horizontal agreement.53  Therefore, the NDRC could have directly 
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applied the fallback provision to the Japanese automobiles part cases 
and International RORO shipping cases and defined bid rigging as a 
prohibited horizontal agreement.   
However, it is not certain what the implications will be if a 
specific horizontal agreement is determined as a violation of article 
13 through the fallback provision in a future case.54  It is highly 
questionable whether such decisions would be binding, given that 
China is a civil law country.  Therefore, direct application of the 
fallback provision to cases as an approach to determine bid rigging as 
a horizontal agreement is not ideal.  Nevertheless, under the AML, it 
seems that the fallback provision is the only existing and justifiable 
provision to incorporate bid rigging into the law for the sake of 
regulation. 
VI. SUGGESTIONS 
In early 2014, Sun Hongzhi, the Deputy Director of the State 
Administration for Industry and Commerce of the People’s Republic 
of China (hereinafter SAIC), pointed out that the agency “needs to 
impose stringent punishments to cases that involve monopoly 
agreements that disrupt market competition orders severely and have 
huge impact to the economy.”55  In the same year, the State Council 
issued the Opinions of the State Council on Promoting Fair Market 
Competition and Maintaining the Normal Market Order in which it 
stated that “strict regulation shall be applied.”56  In early 2015, the 
SAIC Director, Zhang Mao, said that the agency was further 
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strengthening the anti-monopoly law enforcement. 57   From these 
developments, it is clear that the Chinese government has the 
intention to strengthen the fight against severe anti-competitive 
behaviors. 
As explained in Part II of this Note, the OECD introduced the 
term “hardcore cartel” to describe the most egregious violations of 
competition law.  It exists in four forms: price fixing, market 
allocation, output restriction, and bid rigging.  A hardcore cartel is 
generally regarded as illegal per se because the implementation of a 
hardcore cartel will inevitably cause severe harm to market 
competition and consumer interests.  In other words, hardcore cartels 
are viewed as an unreasonable restriction to market competition 
under all circumstances, so it is not applicable to the Rule of 
Reason.58  The first three enumerations under article 13.1 correspond 
to price fixing, market allocation, and output restriction—the three 
forms of hardcore cartel, respectively.  In fact, in early 2008, Philip 
H. Warren, the Chief of the San Francisco Office of the U.S. Justice 
Department’s Antitrust Division, noticed the absence of a bid rigging 
enumeration and suggested that it should be incorporated into AML 
article 13.59 
Since bid rigging is one of the most serious anti-competitive 
behaviors, the AML should ensure that business operators foresee the 
legal consequences of bid rigging, to achieve a deterrent effect.  Early 
in the submission of the Draft for its first deliberation, Cao Kangtai, 
the Director of the Legislative affairs Office of the State Council 
highlighted that one of the rationales adopted when the State Council 
drafted the AML was to set clear and precise regulations such that 
undertakings could understand the law easily and cultivate a habit to 
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follow the law autonomously.60  In other words, the design of the 
AML emphasizes on not only a restraint function, but also a guiding 
function.61 
However, in terms of the regulation of bid rigging, the extant 
law has failed to achieve a guiding function because its predictability 
is low in light of the absence of bid rigging as an enumeration under 
article 13 of the AML.  In general, laws should be written with 
reasonable clarity.62  One way to gauge legal certainty is a citizen’s 
ability to organize behavior in such a way that does not break the 
law.63  Bid rigging may not be an uncommon term in the business 
world.  However, as bid rigging was not enumerated, it is impossible 
for one, simply by reading the AML, to be able to project that bid 
rigging is categorized as price fixing under article 13.  Moreover, 
business operators should not be expected to anticipate that bid 
rigging is categorized as price fixing under article 13 because, as 
discussed before, it is principally wrong to interpret the price fixing 
enumeration in a board sense.  
In sum, it is hard for business operators to learn that bid 
rigging is prohibited by the AML.  The current dilemma is that the 
law enforcement agency intends to regulate bid rigging under AML 
article 13, but article 13 as it exists does not provide a clear legal basis 
to do so.  Although the agency could use the fallback provision to 
regulate bid rigging, this does not exhibit the guiding function that 
the AML meant to have because the publicity of individual cases is 
very limited.  In addition, it would be too demanding to expect 
business operators to go through cases and learn by themselves that 
bid rigging is identified as a violation of the AML article 13 through 
the fallback provision.  Therefore, to prevent business operators from 
committing a bid rigging offence inadvertently and to enhance the 
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deterrent effect of the AML, bid rigging should be enumerated under 
article 13. 
The above conclusion should not be expanded to all other 
non-enumerated monopoly agreements.  It is unnecessary to list all 
the non-enumerated horizontal agreements under article 13.  The 
fallback provision exists for a good reason.  It gives more flexibility 
to the AML and enables law enforcement agencies to identify and 
regulate new forms of agreements over time.  At the same time, 
amending the AML is costly.  It is impossible to amend the law itself 
periodically to update the enumerations under article 13.  However, 
from the perspective of efficiency, there is greater benefit from 
incorporating bid rigging into the article compared to other forms.  As 
the harm caused by bid rigging, a form of a hardcore cartel, is higher, 
the return to society for preventing a bid rigging violation would be 
higher.  Taking the two China cases for example, a total fine of 1.2 
billion Chinese yuan was imposed but might have been avoided with 
the enumeration of bid rigging under article 13.  Therefore, bid 
rigging should be distinguished from other non-enumerated 
agreements and treated differently.  In short, there is an urgent need 
to add bid rigging to article 13 as an independent enumeration. 
Bid rigging cannot be added to article 13 without the 
amendment of the AML.  However, the AML has not been amended 
since it came into effect in 2008, and it is not known when it would 
be amended in the future, despite the growing trend of strengthening 
AML enforcement against serious anti-competitive behaviors, 
including bid rigging, in China in recent years.  Therefore, as an 
alternative to execute the fallback provision, this Note suggests that, 
in the short run, the NDRC issue provisions as a timely and less costly 
solution to incorporate the regulation of bid rigging into the AML.64  
This approach is preferred to applying the fallback provision for two 
reasons.  First, provisions have greater publicity than the written 
opinions of cases, so it could better fulfil the AML’s guiding function. 
Provisions will be more well-known, easily accessible, and 
understandable to business operators.  Second, China is not a 
common law country.  Law enforcement agencies’ case decisions 
have no binding effect.  The NDRC’s application of the fallback 
                                                                                                               
 64 “Provisions” are administrative rules in China.  Guizhang Zhiding Chengxu Tiaoli 
( ) [Regulations on Procedures for the Formulation of Rules] 
(promulgated by the St. Council, Nov. 16, 2001, effective Jan. 1, 2002), http://en.pkulaw.cn/
display.aspx?cgid=38100&lib=law [http://perma.cc/XEU7-MY8X]. 
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provision and decision that bid rigging is a violation of article 13.1(1) 
in a particular case may not be applicable to future cases.  However, 
there will undoubtedly be more consistent decisions if provisions are 
available for law enforcement agencies to follow.  All in all, 
provisions can reduce the chance of a business operator committing 
an offence inadvertently due to the lack of legal certainty in the 
regulation of bid rigging under the AML. 
In sum, law enforcement agencies should immediately stop 
using the “fixing or changing the price of commodities” enumeration 
under article 13.1 to regulate bid rigging.  In the short run, the 
agencies could regulate big rigging using the fallback provision.  This 
is a feasible approach but does not sufficiently exhibit the guiding 
function of the law.  Therefore, the NDRC could consider issuing 
provisions to incorporate the regulation of bid rigging into the AML.  
Then, it will be clearer to business operators that bid rigging is 
identified as a horizontal agreement that is prohibited by the law.  In 
the long run, when there is a chance to amend the AML, bid rigging 
should be enumerated under AML article 13.1. 
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